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Abstract
The desired security properties of electronic voting protocols include veriﬁability, accuracy, democ-
racy and fairness. In this paper we use a static program analysis tool to validate these properties
for one of the classical voting protocols under appropriate assumptions. The protocol is formalised
in an extension of the LYSA process calculus with blinding signatures. The analysis, which is fully
automatic, pinpoints previously undiscovered ﬂaws related to veriﬁability and accuracy and we
suggest modiﬁcations of the protocol needed for validating these properties.
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1 Introduction
Electronic voting promises a convenient and inexpensive alternative to the
classical paper vote. Due to the rapid growth in computer networks, most
people nowadays have access to the internet. This makes electronic voting a
viable alternative for governmental elections, as well as small scale elections
and surveys. However, the use of electronic voting systems introduces new
ways to systematically disrupt the voting or falsify the result. If these systems
are to replace the classical way of voting, the communities that hold the
elections should be convinced of their correctness.
1
Email: s991190@student.dtu.dk
2
Email: s991546@student.dtu.dk
3
Email: riis@imm.dtu.dk
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 135 (2005) 115–134
1571-0661 © 2005 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2005.06.001
The ﬁrst step in that direction is to identify what security properties a
voting protocol should satisfy. Security properties for electronic voting sys-
tems diﬀer from those in ordinary protocol schemes; as in [12] these can be
summarized into four main properties:
• Veriﬁability: A system is veriﬁable if the voters independently can verify
that their votes have been counted correctly.
• Accuracy: The accuracy of a voting system is divided into three parts: (1)
it is not possible for a vote to be altered, (2) a validated vote cannot be
eliminated from the ﬁnal tally and (3) an invalid vote cannot be counted in
the ﬁnal tally.
• Democracy: A system ensures democracy if (1) only eligible voters can
vote and (2) eligible voters can only vote once.
• Privacy: In a voting system the privacy is obtained if nobody can link any
ballot to the voter who cast it.
Often a ﬁfth property is added [3,14]:
• Fairness: No early results from the voting can be obtained.
In this paper we show that static program analysis [23] can be used to
validate several of these properties, in particular the properties of veriﬁability,
accuracy, democracy and fairness. We illustrate this for the FOO92 protocol
developed for large scale elections by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta [14]. This
protocol makes use of Chaums blind signatures [10,11] which is a mechanism
allowing a message to be signed by another party without revealing any infor-
mation about the message to the other party. Assuming perfect cryptography,
blinding is a cryptographic primitive obeying the following two rules:
(Unblind 1) unblindb(blindb(msg)) = msg
(Unblind 2) unblindb(signs(blindb(msg))) = signs(msg)
Here msg is a message, b is a cryptographic key known as the blinding factor
and s is a digital signature. The second rule is the most interesting one as
it expresses that a signed blinded message can be unblinded without disclos-
ing any information about the message itself; note that the signature of the
message is not destroyed. The ﬁrst rule simply states that blinding acts as
symmetric encryption when no signature is present.
In Section 2 we present the FOO92 protocol in more detail. In order to
formalise the protocol in the LYSA calculus [6,7] we introduce an extension of
this calculus in Section 3 and proceed by formalising the FOO92 protocol in
the extended LYSA calculus in Section 4. The extensions of the static analysis
corresponding to the extensions of the LYSA calculus are then developed in
Section 5; they have been implemented in the LYSATool [9,19] which is used to
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automatically produce the analysis results presented in Section 6. In Appendix
A a more thorough description of the blinding extension has been provided.
2 The FOO92 Voting Protocol
The FOO92 protocol [14] involves three kinds of principals: There are multiple
voters V , one administrator A and one counter C. The administrator ensures
that only legitimate voters are allowed to vote and the counter collects, pub-
lishes and counts the votes. In addition to digital signatures, encryption and
blinding the FOO92 protocol incorporates another cryptographic primitive,
bit-commitment [22]. This is a method by which the voter can commit to a
bit without revealing what it is. Later the bit can be revealed by the voter by
providing the commitment key. The protocol proceeds in ﬁve phases as shown
in Table 1 and is further explained below.
1. V → A : V, signV (blindb(commitr(v))) Preparation Phase
2. A → V : signA(blindb(commitr(v))) Administration Phase
3. (V ) → C : signA(commitr(v)) Voting Phase
4. C → : l, signA(commitr(v)) Publishing Phase
5. (V ) → C : l, r Opening Phase
Table 1
Protocol Narration for FOO92
In the preparation phase (1) the voter V selects vote v and computes
the bit-commitment x = commitr(v) using a random number r and the bit-
commitment function commit. The commitment is then blinded using the
blinding factor b and the resulting e = blindb(x), called the ballot, is signed
s = signV (e) and sent to the administrator A.
In the administration phase (2) A veriﬁes that V has the right to vote, has
not applied for a signature yet and that s actually is V ’s signature of e. If
this is the case then A signs the ballot d = signA(e) and sends it back to V .
When V receives the ballot signed by A the voting phase (3) begins. V
checks that the signature on the ballot originates from A and unblinds the
signed ballot y = unblindb(d) thereby obtaining a signed version of the com-
mitted vote, that is y = signA(x). The voter then sends the signed ballot y
to the counter over an anonymous communication channel, this is denoted by
(V ) as the sender in the narration.
In the publishing phase (4) the counter receives y, checks the correctness
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of the signature and enters (l, y) onto a list as the l-th item. After all votes
are received e.g. after a ﬁxed deadline, C publishes the list with all entries.
In the last phase, the opening phase (5), the voter checks that his ballot
x is in the list and sends l together with the commitment key r to C on an
anonymous channel. When C receives r he is able to open the ballot and
count the vote v.
Assumptions. In order to analyse this protocol, we have to make some
speciﬁc assumptions. These assumptions are described in or can be derived
from the original protocol description [14]:
• Bit-committed votes are unique;
• The administrator only signs one vote for each eligible voter;
• The counter C is a trusted party, ie. if the counter receives a vote then it
is also counted correctly in the ﬁnal tally;
• The counter must have received all votes in the voting phase before com-
mencing the publishing phase;
• The voting is only accepted if the number of votes counted by the counter
equals the number of votes signed by the administrator; and
• The voting is only accepted if the counter in the opening phase receives all
the commitment keys for the votes published.
3 LYSA -Calculus with Blinding
In order to apply our analysis technique we have to formalise the protocol
narration as a process in the LYSA-calculus. LYSA is a process calculus in the π-
calculus [21] tradition and uses ideas from the Spi-calculus [1] for incorporating
cryptographic operations. LYSA simpliﬁes matters compared to other calculi
in that all messages are sent on a global network, the ether.
The details of LYSA are described in [6,7]; however in order to analyse the
FOO92 protocol we need to extend the calculus with a blinding construct.
The resulting syntax for terms is given in Table 2.
The names n will be used to represent shared keys, commitment keys as
well as blinding factors and as we shall see later bit-commitments are repre-
sented as symmetric encryption using a shared key as the commitment key.
As usual digital signatures are obtained using asymmetric encryption with
a private key. The special construct [[E1, · · · , Ek]]E0 is used for blinding the
tuple E1, · · · , Ek of values with the blinding factor E0.
The syntax of processes is given in Table 3. In addition to the classical
constructs for composing processes, LYSA contains an input construct with
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E ::= x variable
n name
m+/m− public/private keypair
{E1, · · · , Ek}E0 symmetric encryption
{|E1, · · · , Ek|}E0 asymmetric encryption
[E1, · · · , Ek]E0 blinding
Table 2
Terms for LYSA with blinding
P ::= 0 nil
P1 | P2 parallel
!P replication
(ν n)P restriction (name)
(ν± m)P restriction (keypair)
〈E1, · · · , Ek〉.P output
(E1, · · · , Ej ; xj+1, · · · , xk).P input
decrypt E as {E1, · · · , Ej ; xj+1, · · · , xk}E0 inP symmetric decrypt.
decrypt E as {|E1, · · · , Ej ; xj+1, · · · , xk|}E0 inP asymmetric decrypt.
unblind E as [E1, · · · , Ej ; xj+1, · · · , xk]E0 inP unblinding
Table 3
Syntax for LYSA with blinding
matching and two decryption operations with matching; the construct for un-
blinding follows the same trend. In the case of input the idea is that the pat-
tern (E1, · · · , Ej; xj+1, · · · , xk) must be matched towards a tuple (E
′
1, · · · , E
′
k)
of the same length and it only succeeds if the j ﬁrst components pairwise
equals one another, i.e. E1 = E
′
1, · · · , Ej = E
′
j . If this is the case the re-
maining k − j values E ′j+1, · · · , E
′
k are bound to the variables xj+1, · · · , xk.
The idea behind the pattern matching of the constructs for symmetric and
asymmetric decryption is similar with the only modiﬁcation that in the case
of symmetric encryption the two keys must be equal whereas for asymmetric
encryption they must form a key pair. The unblinding construct takes the
form unblind E as [[E1, · · · , Ej; xj+1, · · · , xk]]E0 inP . As already explained in
the introduction the construct may act as an ordinary decryption using the
blinding factor as a symmetric key (rule unblind1) and in this case E must take
the form [[E ′1, · · · , E
′
k]]E′
0
in order for the construct to succeed and furthermore
the conditions E0 = E
′
0, E1 = E
′
1, · · · , Ej = E
′
j must be fulﬁlled. When suc-
ceeding the variables xj+1, · · · , xk will be bound to E
′
j+1, · · · , E
′
k as explained
above. The more interesting alternative arises when E evaluates to a signed
blinded value, i.e. has the form {|[[E ′1, · · · , E
′
m]]E′
0
|}Es. In this case the pattern
of the unblinding construct will take the special form unblind E as [[; x]]E0 inP
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and the match will succeed when E0 = E
′
0. The variable x will then be bound
to the signed value {|E ′1, · · · , E
′
m|}Es as already illustrated by the rule (Unblind
2) of the introduction. For completeness the formalisation of these rules are
given in Appendix A.
Annotations in LYSA with blinding. To describe the intention of proto-
cols, the terms and syntax of the cryptographic primitives are decorated with
labels  called crypto-points and assertions of one of two forms:
• each encryption/blinding is annotated with a crypto-point  and an assertion
of the form [dest L] meaning that the corresponding decryption/unblinding
is intended to happen at one of the crypto-points mentioned in the set L of
crypto-points.
• each decryption and unblinding operation is annotated with a crypto-point
and an assertion of the form [orig L] meaning that the value being decrypted
or unblinded is intended to come from one of the crypto-points of L.
The set L should of course be a subset of the entire set of crypto-points C
occurring in the protocol. The annotations will be used in the analysis which
is described in Section 5.
4 Modelling FOO92 in LYSA
We are now ready to model the FOO92 protocol in LYSA . This is done in
two stages: First we shall reﬁne the speciﬁcation given in Table 1 into an
extended protocol narration, which distinguishes between inputs and corre-
sponding outputs and also makes clear which checks must be performed. In
the second stage the extended protocol narration is translated into LYSA (with
blinding).
Extended protocol narration. The extended protocol narration is listed in
Table 4 where we use the LYSA terms and syntax for writing the cryptographic
operations.
First observe that each message is extended with source and destination
information along the lines of IPv4 and IPv6. Upon receipt of a message the
principal will always check whether the message is intended for him; occasion-
ally he will also check that the sender is who he expected. Note that these
components of the message are sent in clear text and are therefore forgeable.
As mentioned earlier we model bit commitment (message 1) as symmetric
encryption with the commitment key r. Digital signatures are modelled using
asymmetric encryption with the principals private key (messages 1 and 2)
and veriﬁcation of a signature is then modelled using asymmetric decryption
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1. V→ : V,A, V, {|[{v}r ]b|}K−
V
1′. →A : yV , yA, y
′
V , y1 [check yV = y
′
V and yA = A]
1′′. A : decrypt y1 as {|y2|}K+yV
[check V ′s signature]
2. A→ : A, yV , {|y2|}K−
A
2′. →V : xA, xV , x1 [check xA = A and xV = V ]
2′′. V : decrypt x1 as {|x2|}K+
A
[check x2 = [{v}r ]b]
2′′′. V : unblind x1 as [x3]b
3. (V )→ : D,C, x3
3′. →C : zD, zC , z1 [check zC = C]
3′′. C : decrypt z1 as {|z2|}K+
A
[check A′s signature]
4. C→ : C,D, z1, l
4′. →V : xC , xD, x4, x5 [check x4 = x3, xC = C and xD = D]
5. (V )→ : D,C, x5, r
5′. →C : z′D, z
′
C , z3, z4 [check z3 = l and z
′
C = C]
5′′. C : decrypt z2 as {z}z4
Table 4
FOO92: Extended protocol narration
with the corresponding public key (messages 1′′, 2′′ and 3′′). In addition to
verifying the administrators signature (message 2′′) the voter must also ensure
that the signed message was indeed his own ballot, unblinding of the signed
ballot (message 2′′′) will then result in a signed commitment of the vote in
accordance with the rule (Unblind 2).
Modelling the anonymous communication channel (messages 3 and 5) is
done by spooﬁng the source with a dummy name D. The publishing of the
votes is done by sending each vote on the list to everyone on the ether - again
the dummy D name can be used, now as the destination.
LYSA speciﬁcation. The extended narration can easily be translated into
LYSA by dividing the narration into 3 processes, one for each principal. The
LYSA speciﬁcation of the protocol is given in Table 5. As we shall see shortly
the analysis of LYSA does not support rebinding of variables and new variables
can only be introduced by input, decryption and unblinding. Therefore a small
trick has to be used when a signature has to be veriﬁed but not removed: The
recipient of the message has to decrypt the signature and then resign the
content by using the same signature. This does not compromise the analysis
as the signature of the message has already been veriﬁed. The trick is used in
the model of both the voter and the counter (messages 3 and 4).
In the LYSA speciﬁcation we add annotations to all cryptographic opera-
tions as described earlier in Section 3. The sets of crypto-points La1 and Lc1
for the destination/origin assertions depend of the property that should be
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analysed and we shall come back to those in Section 6. In all other cases the
assertion sets will be equal to the entire set C of crypto-points no matter what
property is being analysed - as an example digital signatures can be veriﬁed
by anyone as it only requires knowledge of the public key.
In order to ensure that we analyse against the hardest attacker, the attacker
should initially have knowledge of all the public keys. This is done in the LYSA
speciﬁcation by sending these values in plaintext on the ether in parallel with
the principals in the protocol.
(ν± KV ) (ν± KA)
( (ν v) (ν r) (ν b) / ∗ Voter ∗ /
1. 〈V,A,V, {|[{v}v1r [dest C ]]
v2
b [dest C ]|}
v3
K
−
V
[dest C ]〉.
2′. (A,V ; x1 ).
2′′. decrypt x1 as {|; x2|}v4
K
+
A
[orig C ] in
2′′′. unblind x2 as [; x3]v5
b
[orig C ] in
3. 〈D,C, {|x3|}v6
K
−
A
[dest C ]〉.
4′. (C,D, {|x3|}v7
K
−
A
[dest C ]; x4 ).
5. 〈D,C, x4, r〉.0
1′. | (V,A,V ; y1). / ∗ Administrator ∗ /
1′′. decrypt y1 as {|; y2|}a1
K
+
V
[origLa1 ] in
2. 〈A,V, {|y2|}a2
K
−
A
[dest C ]〉.0
| (ν l) / ∗ Counter ∗ /
3′. (D,C; z1 ).
3′′. decrypt z1 as {|; z2|}c1
K
+
A
[origLc1 ] in
4. 〈C,D, {|z2|}c2
K
−
A
[dest C ], l〉.
5′. (D,C, l; z3 ).
5′′. decrypt z2 as {; z4}c3z3[orig C ] in 0
| 〈K+V , K
+
A 〉.0 / ∗ Knowledge of the attacker ∗ /
)
Table 5
FOO92 in LYSA -calculus
5 The Analysis
The analysis is speciﬁed as a Flow Logic in [6,7] for LYSA (without blinding);
here we shall only explain the general form of the judgements and refer the
reader to the above papers for a more thorough presentation of the analysis.
The analysis of the blinding constructs is given in details in Appendix A.
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The aim of the analysis is to give a safe over-approximation of all pos-
sible messages communicated on the network, along with the possible value
bindings of the variables. Furthermore the analysis will record all violations
that there may be to the destination/origin annotations. In the analysis we
assume perfect cryptography meaning that decryption can only be done using
the correct key and similarly unblinding can only be done using the correct
blinding factor.
The analysis of each term E will determine a superset of the possible values
it may evaluate to. To do this we keep track of all potential value bindings to
variables in a global abstract environment ρ:
ρ : maps the variables to all values they may be bound to.
The judgement for expressions takes the form:
ρ |= E : ϑ
and expresses that ϑ is an acceptable estimate of the set of values that E may
evaluate to in the abstract environment ρ.
In the analysis of a process P we focus on which values may ﬂow on the
network. In order to do this we keep track of all potential messages on the
network ether in the abstract network environment κ:
κ : includes all message tuples that may ﬂow on the network.
To obtain this information we make use of the abstract environment ρ, and
the judgement for processes has the form:
(ρ, κ) |= P : ψ
with the error-component ψ:
ψ : holds an over-approximation of the origin/destination violations.
If (, ′) ∈ ψ then something that was encrypted or blinded at crypto-point 
was unexpectedly decrypted or unblinded at ′. The judgements for terms and
processes are deﬁned for LYSA in [6,7] and in Appendix A we have extended
these to include blinding.
To ensure that protocols are analysed for vulnerabilities against any attack
possible they are analysed in conjunction with the Dolev-Yao attacker [13].
This attacker can perform the following actions: (1) Receive all messages sent
on the ether; (2) Decrypt messages if he knows the key or unblind messages
if he knows the blinding factor; (3) Construct new encryptions or blindings
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from values he knows; (4) Send messages constructed from values he knows;
and (5) Generate new values.
The attacker uses a special crypto-point • for encryption/decryption and
blinding/unblinding. The knowledge of the attacker is collected in a special
variable z•.
To better understand the analysis, consider the following ﬂawed protocol
with two principals A and B. In the protocol A generates a fresh key K and
sends it in clear to B along with a message m which is symmetric encrypted
under the key K (at crypto-point A). Upon receiving the messages xK and
x, B decrypts x with the key xK (at crypto-point B).
((ν m) (ν K) 〈A,B,K, {m}AK [destLA ]〉.0 / ∗ A ∗ /
|
(A,B; xK , x). decrypt x as {; xm}
B
xK [origLB ] in 0) / ∗B ∗ /
The encryption at crypto-point A is intended to be decrypted only at B and
correspondingly the decryption at B should originate from the encryption at
A, hence we have the sets of crypto-points LA = {B} and LB = {A}. The
analysis of this protocol gives 〈A,B,K, {m}AK [destLA ]〉 ∈ κ as this message is
sent over the network. Since the attacker learns everything sent on the ether
the analysis also gives K ∈ ρ(z•) as well as {m}
A
K [destLA ] ∈ ρ(z•). As the
attacker knows the key, he can decrypt the message {m}AK [destLA ] and hence
the analysis yields the violation to the annotations (A, •) ∈ ψ. The analysis
also yields the violation (•, B) ∈ ψ as B does not know the key in advance,
therefore the attacker can create a new key K• and a new message m• and
send the message 〈A,B,K•, {m•}K•〉 on the ether, which would be accepted
by B.
The correctness of the analysis with respect to the operational semantics
is formally established in [6,7] and extended to the blinding constructs in [2].
Hence it follows that if ψ is empty it guarantees that no violations of the
annotations can exist and if a message sequence is not present in κ then it will
never be sent on the network. This is of interest as the attacker may send any
value he learns on the network, so if a value is not present in κ (or equivalent
in ρ(z•)) then conﬁdentiality of that value is guaranteed.
The analysis presented in this paper is implemented as an extension of the
LYSATool [19] which already implements the analysis of [6,7].
6 Analysis Result
The FOO92 protocol is designed to run with many voters, one administrator
and one counter. However as noted in [16] another interesting scenario is
with many voters, many administrators and one counter. Our analysis covers
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both of these scenarios and we have in particular analysed the protocol for an
arbitrarily large number rather than than a ﬁxed number of principals, as this
is one of the strengths of the LYSATool. For readability in the following LYSA
speciﬁcations we have only one principal for each of the roles in the protocol
(voter, administrator, counter and attacker). However as mentioned above the
protocol is analysed with an arbitrary number of principals acting as voters,
administrators and attackers such that interference within multiple principals
is also considered.
In our scenarios the attacker is also an eligible voter. If the security proper-
ties are satisﬁed in this scenario they are obviously also satisﬁed if the attacker
is not allowed to vote.
For each property we shall write the assertions that describes the property,
that is we shall specify the sets La1 and Lc1 of crypto-points left unspeciﬁed
in Table 5. We shall now discuss each of the properties of interest in turn and
summarise the results at the end of the section.
Veriﬁability. A system is veriﬁable if the voters independently can verify
that their vote has been counted correctly. A voter can be sure of this when
he is certain that the counter has received the committed vote due to the
assumption deﬁned in Section 2, namely that the counter is trusted and that
the voting will be dismissed if not all commitment keys for the votes published
are received. This means that the veriﬁability property concerns authentica-
tion of the list published by the counter. The input (message 4’) in the LYSA
speciﬁcation must originate from the counter but in LYSA we cannot add an-
notations to plaintext messages. We can however encode this assertion by
symmetric encryption of the message from the counter with a key K, known
also by the attacker, thereby not restricting the analysis. This addition to the
LYSA speciﬁcation of the protocol is done as follows:
4′. (C,D; x4 ). / ∗ Voter ∗ /
4′′. decrypt x4 as {{|x3|}v7
K
−
A
[dest C ]; x5}v8K [origLv8 ] in
...
4. 〈C,D, {{|z2|}c2
K
−
A
[dest C ], l}c4K [dest C ]〉. / ∗ Counter ∗ /
...
| 〈K+V ,K
+
A ,K〉.0 / ∗ Knowledge of the attacker ∗ /
By taking Lv8 = {c4} we require that the publication of the list must originate
from the counter. This speciﬁcation has been analysed with the LYSATool
together with the requirements that the sets La1 and Lc1 of crypt-points equal
C, the complete set of crypto-points. The LYSATool reports a potential attack,
namely that publishing of the list can originate from the attacker: (•, v8) ∈ ψ.
The description of FOO92 [14] requires that the publication is accessible
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to all voters, but it does not say anything about the authentication of the
list. In recent work [18] and in our interpretation of the protocol description,
publication of the list is modelled by sending it on the ether, but as the analysis
shows, this is not suﬃcient to guarantee veriﬁability.
This ﬂaw has to the best of our knowledge not been reported in previous
literature, but a simple amendment to the protocol can correct it. If the
counter signs the list before publishing, as shown below, it turns out that the
protocol is veriﬁable; that is, the analysis tool gives ψ = ∅. Note that the
public key K+C of the counter is published on the ether in order to let the
attacker know it. The amendments of the protocol are:
4′. (C,D; x4 ). / ∗ Voter ∗ /
4′′. decrypt x4 as {|{|x3|}v7
K
−
A
[dest C ]; x5|}v8
K
+
C
[origLv8 ] in
...
4. 〈C,D, {|{|z2|}c2
K
−
A
[dest C ], l|}c4
K
−
C
[dest C ]〉. / ∗ Counter ∗ /
...
| 〈K+V , K
+
A ,K
+
C 〉.0 / ∗ Knowledge of the attacker ∗ /
The remaining properties to be discussed below are validated for this version
of the protocol.
Accuracy. As mentioned in the introduction, accuracy of a voting protocol is
obtained when (1) it is not possible for a vote to be altered, (2) invalid votes
must not be counted in the ﬁnal tally and (3) all validated votes must count
in the ﬁnal tally.
We will begin with property (2). A valid vote is a committed vote signed
by the administrator, which is obtained by the voter after the unblinding at
crypto-point v6. In order for a vote to count in the ﬁnal tally it has to be
accepted by the counter at crypto-point c1. Hence we shall take Lc1 = {v6}
whereas the other sets La1 and Lv8 of crypto-points are set to C.
Analysing the protocol yields a violation to the assertions: (a2, c1) ∈ ψ
ie. the blinded, signed ballots can be accepted by the counter without being
unblinded ﬁrst. Inspecting the protocol shows that this is indeed possible be-
cause the counter accepts any new ballot which is signed by the administrator
without being able to verify the content of the ballot, hence the counter is not
able to distinguish between a committed vote or a blinded committed vote.
This means that the attacker is able to get an arbitrarily large number n of
ballots accepted by the counter in the voting phase. He can do this by blinding
his ballot n−1 times before having it validated by the administrator and then
unblinding the signed result n − 1 times, thereby obtaining n unique values
all signed by the administrator. He will of course only be able to supply the
counter with a commitment key for one of these values (the one unblinded
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n− 1 times) and therefore this attack will not violate accuracy but only force
the voting to be disqualiﬁed.
Clearly the existence of this denial of service attack is not very satisfactory
and it can be avoided by extending the speciﬁcation. As the header of an
encrypted value often contains information on the type of encryption used, we
extend the LYSA speciﬁcation by adding a header BIT to the committed vote
in the ﬁrst message:
1. 〈V,A, V, {|[BIT, {v}v1r [dest C ]]
v2
b
[dest C ]|}v3
K
−
V
[dest C ]〉.
And then step 3′′ only succeeds when the received messages is an unblinded
message with BIT in the header:
3′′. decrypt z1 as {|BIT ; z2|}c1
K
+
A
[origLc1 ] in
Additionally we let the attacker know the value BIT by sending it in plaintext
on the ether, as this value merely models a standard header.
Analysing the protocol in a scenario where the attacker is allowed to vote
we get the violations of the assertion; (a20, c1) ∈ ψ and (c2, c1) ∈ ψ. The
ﬁrst violation (a20, c1) ∈ ψ means that the attacker (indexed 0 in the analysis
result) may get his validated vote accepted by the counter without unblinding
it; this is equivalent to saying that the attacker can get his vote validated by
the administrator without blinding it. The corresponding attack is as follows:
1. DY→A : V, signV (BIT, commitr(v))
2. A →DY : signA(BIT, commitr(v))
3. DY→C : signA(BIT, commitr(v))
4. C →DY : signC(l, signA(BIT, commitr(v)))
5. DY→C : l, r
This attack shows that the attacker can choose not to blind his committed
vote and hence be un-anonymous. However this does not violate that only
valid ballots can be accepted by the counter as the attacker still needs to
get his ballot validated by the administrator. Therefore we can extend the
assertion Lc1 to include a20.
Turning to the violation (c2, c1) ∈ ψ we observe that the assumption, that
the counter must have received all votes in the voting phase before commencing
the publishing phase, contradicts that something encrypted at crypto-point c2
can be decrypted at c1 and hence we extend the assertion Lc1 to include c2
as well. Now analysing the protocol with the sets La1 and Lv8 equal to C and
Lc1 = {v6, a20, c2} we obtain an empty ψ-component which means that no
invalid votes can get accepted by the counter and therefore cannot count in
the ﬁnal tally.
For part (1) of the accuracy property we note that, as we assume perfect
cryptography, it is not possible for a vote to be altered when it has been
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validated. That the vote cannot be altered before validation can be observed
from the possible variable bindings of x3 in the analysis result, ρ(x3) = {{v}r}.
Knowing that the analysis is an over-approximation we can be certain that
only the unaltered vote can be validated and accepted by the voter, and we
have that (1) is satisﬁed.
That all validated votes are counted, as required by part (3) of the accuracy
property, relies on our assumptions and the previous parts. We know from
part (2) that invalid ballots cannot be counted in the ﬁnal tally. With the
assumptions that the administrator only signs one ballot for each voter, that
the number of accepted votes by the counter must be the same as the number of
validated votes by the administrator and that every accepted ballot is unique,
we can conclude that all validated votes must be counted in the ﬁnal tally and
thus that accuracy is satisﬁed.
Democracy. Democracy is obtained if (1) only eligible voters can vote and
(2) they can only vote once.
Being able to vote (1) has two issues in the FOO92 protocol. Firstly, if and
only if you are an eligible voter you must be able to get your ballot validated.
Secondly, only validated ballots and all validated ballots must be accepted by
the authority of the tallying, but this was already established by the validation
of accuracy.
That only eligible voters are able to vote is modelled by La1 = {v3}, mean-
ing that the vote being validated by the administrator does indeed originate
from the voter it is being validated for. Analysis of the protocol with this as-
sertion (and Lc1 and Lv8 equal to C) yields an empty ψ-component and hence
the ﬁrst part of democracy holds.
That eligible voters are only allowed to vote once (2) can be validated
if no replay attacks can be made on the ﬁrst two messages sent from the
voter (messages 1 and 3). No replay attack on the ﬁrst message ensures that
each voter can only get one valid vote, and no replay attack on the second
message ensures that validated votes are only accepted once. According to
the taxonomy of replay attacks [24] there are the following categories of replay
attacks:
• From which session does the replayed message come from?
(1) Parallel/old/current session between same pair of players as in the at-
tacked session.
(2) Parallel/old session between a diﬀerent pair of players.
• Who is the recipient of the replayed message?
(a) Intended recipient.
(b) Diﬀerent recipient (sender of the message or third party).
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• Is the message used as intended in the protocol?
(i) Replayed message is used with intended purpose.
(ii) Replayed message is used with diﬀerent purpose (type attack).
A replay attack can be classiﬁed with triple from the set {1, 2}×{a, b}×{i, ii}.
If a protocol is annotated properly the LYSATool ﬁnds attacks of the types
(2, ∗, ∗), (∗, b, ∗) and (∗, ∗, ii) where the entries ∗ can be chosen arbitrarily [20].
The only remaining replay attack is type (1, a, i), which is when a message is
re-sent to the intended recipient and used with intended purpose, in a parallel
or new session.
A type (1, a, i) replay attack on the validation from the administrator
would mean that the same voter had two or more votes validated by the
administrator, but this contradicts our assumptions. A type (1, a, i) replay
attack on the counter would mean that the counter accepted the same vote
twice, but again this contradicts our assumption that all committed ballots
are unique and that the counter only accepts one of each. Hence this type of
replay attack is not possible according to our assumptions in Section 2 and
as LYSATool does not report any violations to our assertions we can conclude
that democracy is satisﬁed.
Fairness. A voting protocol is fair when early results from the voting cannot
be obtained; in the FOO92 speciﬁcation [14] this is deﬁned as being before the
opening phase. We shall model this by eliminating the opening phase in the
LYSA speciﬁcation and claim that if the votes are then not in the knowledge of
the attacker, fairness is obtained. Running the analysis in this scenario (with
all L equal to C) we do indeed observe that v /∈ ρ(z•) thereby validating the
fairness property.
It is interesting to note that the fairness property is still satisﬁed even
when the administrator and the counter conspire. This can be validated by
letting the attacker know the secret keys for both the administrator and the
counter; in this way he can act on behalf of both. As already mentioned we
obtain v /∈ ρ(z•) also in this scenario.
Privacy. Privacy is obtained when no one can link any ballot to the voter
who cast it. Validation of this property cannot be observed directly from the
analysis result from LYSATool as the analysis result is an over-approximation
of the values that the attacker may learn, but it does hold any information
about how these values are related. In FOO92 the attacker learns both the
vote and the identity of the voter, however only if the attacker can link them
together, privacy is violated.
In [18] the privacy property is proven to be satisﬁed using equivalence the-
ory. The proof also shows that an additional assumption is required, namely
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that all voters should have ﬁnished the administration phase before the voting
phase begins.
Summary. Table 6 contains the version of the FOO92 protocol that we have
successfully validated using the LYSATool . The sets La1, Lc1 and Lv8 have
been selected individually to capture the property of interest as described in
this section.
(ν± KV ) (ν± KA) (ν± KC ) (ν BIT )
( (ν v) (ν r) (ν b) / ∗ Voter ∗ /
1. 〈V,A,V, {|[BIT, {v}v1r [dest C ]]
v2
b
[dest C ]|}v3
K
−
V
[dest C ]〉.
2′. (A,V ; x1 ).
2′′. decrypt x1 as {|; x2|}v4
K
+
A
[orig C ] in
2′′′. unblind x2 as [; x3, x4]v5
b
[orig C ] in
3. 〈D,C, {|x3, x4|}v6
K
−
A
[dest C ]〉.
4′. (C,D; x5 ).
4′′. decrypt x5 as {|{|x3, x4|}v7
K
−
A
[dest C ]; x6|}v8
K
+
C
[origLv8 ] in
5. 〈D,C, x6, r〉.0
1′. | (V,A,V ; y1). / ∗ Administrator ∗ /
1′′. decrypt y1 as {|; y2|}a1
K
+
V
[origLa1 ] in
2. 〈A,V, {|y2|}a2
K
−
A
[dest C ]〉.0
| (ν l) / ∗ Counter ∗ /
3′. (D,C; z1 ).
3′′. decrypt z1 as {|BIT ; z2|}c1
K
+
A
[origLc1 ] in
4. 〈C,D, {|{|BIT, z2|}c2
K
−
A
[dest C ], l|}c4
K
−
C
[dest C ]〉.
5′. (D,C, l; z3 ).
5′′. decrypt z2 as {; z4}c3z3[orig C ] in 0
| 〈K+V ,K
+
A ,K
+
C , BIT 〉.0 / ∗ Knowledge of the attacker ∗ /
)
Table 6
Amended FOO92 in LYSA -calculus
7 Conclusion
In previous work [6,7,8,15] static program analysis has proved to be a sim-
ple and eﬀective approach for validating conﬁdentiality and authentication
properties of key exchange protocols. In this paper we have successfully used
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the very same approach for validating the somewhat diﬀerent kind of secu-
rity properties that apply for electronic voting protocols, namely veriﬁability,
accuracy, democracy and fairness. We have studied one of the ﬁrst voting
protocols presented in the literature, the FOO92 protocol [14]. It is based on
blinding signatures and part of the work presented here has been to accom-
modate this as a primitive in the LYSA framework and the associated tool
[2].
The original protocol speciﬁcation is in the form of a classical protocol nar-
ration leaving out many details. As usual these are crucial when performing
a formal analysis of the protocol - as is a clear formulation of the assumptions
under which the protocol is analysed. Our initial analysis results for veriﬁabil-
ity and accuracy pinpoints ﬂaws in the protocol: we have identiﬁed a denial
of service attack which could force the counter to repeatedly disqualify the
voting process and we have identiﬁed a ﬂaw which allows the attacker to forge
the publishing of votes. The four security properties has subsequently been
validated for the amended protocol given in Table 6.
Some of the security properties for the FOO92 protocol are studied formally
by Kremer and Ryan in [18]; in particular the properties fairness, democracy
(part 1) and privacy. They formalise the protocol in the applied π-calculus
in order to use automated analysis with the tool ProVerif [5] to validate the
ﬁrst two properties. The third property, privacy, is proved by hand using
equivalence theory; they prove that if the voter V1 votes v1 and voter V2 votes
v2 it is observational equivalent to V1 voting v2 and V2 voting v1.
Future work includes applying the analysis to other voting protocols based
on blinding signatures; also we would like to investigate the adaption of the
approach to handing protocols with homomorphic encryptions [4,17].
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A Extending the Analysis for the LYSA -Calculus with
Blinding
The operational semantics and the analysis of LYSA is provided in [6,7] (see
also [8] for a thorough description). In this appendix we specify how to extend
the semantics and the analysis to the new constructs.
Operational semantics. In Table A.1 we formalise the functionality of
blinding in an operational semantics as already explained intuitively in Sec-
tions 1 and 3.
(Unblind 1)
∧ji=0Ei = E
′
i ∧ R(,L
′, ′,L)
unblind [E1, · · · , Ek]

E0
[destL ] as [E′1, · · · , E
′
j ; xj+1, · · · , xk]
′
E′
0
[origL′ ] inP
→R P [Ej+1/xj+1, · · · , Ek/xk]
(Unblind 2)
E0 = E
′
0 ∧ R(,L
′, ′,L)
unblind {|[E1, · · · , Ek]

E0
[destL ]|}
sig
E
sig
0
[destLsig ] as [; x]
′
E′
0
[origL′ ] inP
→R P [{|E1, · · · , Ek|}
sig
E
sig
0
[destLsig ]/x]
Table A.1
Operational semantics for blinding, P →R P
′, parameterized on R
We write E for the term E with all annotations removed, and in (Un-
blind 1) and (Unblind 2) the condition E0 = E
′
0 models perfect blinding.
Note that (Unblind 1) is identical to (Decr) in [6,7]. In (Unblind 2) the
variable x is bound to the signed value {|E1, · · · , Ek|}Esig
0
along with it’s asser-
tions. The operational semantics P →R P
′ with the relation R is considered
in two variants; the standard semantics with reduction relation (→) discards
the annotations and takes R(,L′, ′,L) to be universally true. The reference
monitor semantics with reduction relation (→RM) takes advantage of the an-
notations and takes RM(,L′, ′,L) =  ∈ L′ ∧ ′ ∈ L. The semantics of the
unblinding rules is given by the reference monitor semantics; thus, unblindings
may only occur at crypto-points designated when the corresponding blindings
were made and vice-versa, otherwise the conﬁguration is stuck.
Analysis. As mentioned in Section 5 the analysis is speciﬁed by judgements
of the forms ρ |= E : ϑ and (ρ, κ) |=RM P : ψ. The clauses deﬁning the
judgements may be found in [6,7] for the LYSA calculus so Table A.2 only
specify these for the blinding construct. The rule for the blinding term is very
straightforward and identical to that of symmetric encryption. To produce
the set ϑ, the rule for k-ary blinding ﬁnds the set ϑi for each term Ei, collects
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∧ki=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
(∀V0, V1, · · · , Vk : ∧
k
i=0 Vi ∈ ϑi ⇒ [V1, · · · , Vk]

V0
[destL ] ∈ ϑ)
ρ |= [E1, · · · , Ek]

E0
[destL ] : ϑ
ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
(∀[V1, · · · , Vk]
′
V0
[destL′ ] ∈ ϑ : ∧ji=0 Vi Eϑi ⇒ ∧
k
i=j+1 Vi ∈ ρ(xi ∧
(¬RM(,L′, ′,L) ⇒ (′, ) ∈ ψ)∧
ρ, κ |=RM P : ψ)
∧
(j = 0 ∧ k = 1 ⇒∀{|[V1, · · · , Vk′ ]
′
V0
[destL′ ]|}
sig
V
sig
0
[destLsig ] ∈ ϑ : V0 Eϑ0 ⇒
{|V1, · · · , Vk′ |}
sig
V
sig
0
[destLsig ] ∈ ρ(x1)∧
(¬RM(,L′, ′,L) ⇒ (′, ) ∈ ψ)∧
ρ, κ |=RM P : ψ)
ρ, κ |=RM unblind E as [E1, · · · , Ej ; xj+1, · · · , xk]

E0
[origL ] inP : ψ
Table A.2
Analysis of terms and processes for blinding: ρ |= E : ϑ and (ρ, κ) |=RM P : ψ.
all k-tuples of values (V0, · · · , Vk) taken from ϑ0 × · · · × ϑk into values of the
form [[V1, · · · , Vk]]

V0
[destL ] and requires these values to belong to ϑ.
The rule for the unblinding process consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part
is similar to the rule for symmetric decryption, so we will not describe it
further. If the process has the form unblind E as [[; x1]]

E0
[origL ] inP the
second part of the rule is used. For each value that is signed and blinded;
{|[[V1, · · · , Vk′]]
′
V0
[destL′ ]|}
sig
V
sig
0
[destLsig ] ∈ ϑ it is checked whether the value V0
is included into ϑ0, here the faithful membership E for matching ignores an-
notations. If the check is successful then the value {|V1, · · · , Vk′|}
sig
V
sig
0
[destLsig ]
must be contained in x1, additionally the ψ-component must contain (, 
′) if
the destination/origin assertions might be violated.
The implementation of the analysis is carried out according to [9] and
the complete analysis, the implementation and a proof for soundness of the
analysis is presented in [2].
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